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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
MA VOR JEAN CARNES, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Case No. 18, 370 
CLIFF CARNES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
---0000000- - -
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action based upon a Florida judgment for delinquent 
alimony. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On September 15, 1981, the district court, the Honorable G. 
Hal Taylor presiding, entered an order that, upon the filing by 
plaintiff of proof of service in the Florida action judgment would be 
entered against the defendant. That proof was filed with the district 
court on January 22, 1982, and, after two further hearings, the district 
court, the Honorable David B. Dee presiding, entered judgment against 
1 
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defendant. The defendant appealed only from the judgment of March 5, 
1982. Thereafter, on April 29, 1982, the district court, the Honorable 
David B. Dee again presiding, entered its Order making the entire Decree 
of the Florida court the decree of the district court. No appeal has 
been taken from that ruling. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Mavor Jean Carnes respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm in all respects the judgment entered against appellant 
Cliff Carnes by the district court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter "~.1rs. Carnes") deems it 
necessary to present a statement of the facts of this case since the 
statement presented by defendant-appellant (hereinafter "Mr. Carnes") 
fails to reflect accurately all of the relevent facts and procedural 
history of this case. 
Based upon a complaint for divorce filed by Mr. Carnes in the 
Circuit Court for Brevard County, Florida, a Decree of Divorce was 
entered by the Florida court on July 28, 1978. (R. at 7-8.) That 
Decree provided inter alia that Mr. Carnes was to pay alimony of $60 per 
week and that the Florida court retained jurisdiction of both "the cause 
and the parties" and that service of any further proceedings could be by 
2 
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mail. (Id.) Mr. Carnes never made a single payment to Mrs. Carnes and 
she, acting through Florida counsel, filed a motion for an arrearage 
judgment in the Florida proceedings. (R. at 28.) Notice of the motion 
for an arrearage judgment was served upon Mr. Carnes by the Salt Lake 
County sheriff's department on October 22, 1980. (R. at 26-27 and 
32-34.) The Florida court entered an arrearage judgment against 
Mr. Carnes on November 10, 1980, in the amount of $5,640.05, noting that 
he had paid none of the alimony directed by the court. (R. at 9.) 
On April 28, 1981, Mrs. Carnes filed a complaint with the 
District Court in $alt Lake County, seeking enforcement of the Florida 
arrearage judgment on "full faith and credit" grounds and seeking to 
have the on-going alimony provisions of the original Florida Decree 
recognized by the Utah District Court for enforcement purposes. (R. at 
2-12.) Mr. Carnes filed an Answer raising two basic defenses: first, 
that he was entitled to a claimed off-set against Mrs. Carnes and, 
second, that the Florida alimony law was unconstitutional and the 
Florida court, therefore, had no personal jurisdiction. ( R. at 15-16. ) 
On August 26, 1981, r.lrs. Carnes filed a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (R. at 17-18.) Signlficantly, ~.1r. Carnes filed nothing in 
opposition to that motion, which was heard before the late Honorable G. 
Hal Taylor on September 4, 1981. Judge Taylor ruled that the claimed 
off-set and alleged unconstitutionality of Florida's alimony statutes 
3 
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were insufficient to constitute a defense, noted that Mr. Carnes had 
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Florida court, and entered 
his order that upon the filing by Mrs. Carnes of a Proof of Service of 
her Florida motion for an arrearage judgment, she would be granted 
judgment in the amount of $5, 640. 05. (R. at 21-22.) Mr. Carnes neither 
filed nor preserved an appeal from that Order. 
On January 22, 1982, Mrs. Carnes filed with the Court a 
certified and exemplified copy of a duplicate Affidavit of out-of-state 
service signed by Salt Lake County sheriff's deputy Grant Peterson, 
attesting to the service of the notice and motion of the Florida 
arrearage proceedings upon ~11r. Carnes. (R. at 25-26.) Mrs. Carnes also 
filed a motion for judgnent based upon that proof of service and Judge 
Taylor's earlier ruling. (R. at 23-24.) In opposition to that motion, 
Mr. Carnes filed nothing. 
Thereafter, on February 16, 1982, an Affidavit of Grant 
Peterson was filed, also attesting to the service upon Mr. Carnes. That· 
Affidavit differed from the Proof of Service only in the location at 
which the service was stated to have taken place. Both the Affidavit 
and the Proof of Service attested to personal service. Another he~ring 
was held before the District Court, the Honorable David B. Dee 
presiding, on February 19, 1982. At that time, Judge Dee took the 
matter under advisement. ( R. at 3 5.) 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It was not until February 26, 1982, some six months after 
Mrs. Carnes first moved for the entry of judgment based upon the Florida 
arrearage judgment, that Mr. Carnes filed any Affidavit with the court 
in opposition. In that Affidavit, he claims that on the date Deputy 
Peterson served the Notice of the Florida arrearage proceeding, 
l\1r. Carnes did not reside at the address stated by Deputy Peterson in 
his Proof of Service. Mr. Carnes also makes the conclusory statement 
that he was "never served at any time". (R. at 46.) Significantly, he 
does not state any of the facts upon which that conclusion could have 
been based (e.g., no papers were ever left with him, he never spoke with 
a sheriff's deputy). 
Mrs. Canes having fully complied with Judge Taylor's Order of 
September 15, 1981 (that Proof of Service upon ~,1r. Carnes in the Florida 
arrearage proceeding be filed), Judge Dee entered judgment against 
Hr. Carnes on March 5, 1982. (R. at 59.) The Affidavit of ~.1r. Carnes 
having been filed six months late, Judge Dee acted well within his 
discretion and was bound to follow Judge Taylor's unconditional Order 
that, upon the filing of a Proof of Service, judgment would be entered 
in favor of Mrs. Carnes. 
Thereafter, on April 16, 1982, Mrs. Carnes filed a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings with respect to the recognition by the Utah 
court of the Florida Decree's on-going alimony provisions. (R. at 110.) 
Although Mr. Carnes filed an "objection" to that motion (R. at 114), he 
5 
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again failed to file any Affidavit in opposition to the motion. The 
only ground raised in the "objection" was that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction due to this appeal. On April 29, 1982, Judge Dee entered 
an Order granting full faith and credit to the on-going alimony 
provisions of the Florida Decree. (R. at 118.) No appeal has been 
taken from that Order. 
It is to be noted that nowhere and at no time has Mr. Carnes 
ever disputed that he has failed to pay any of the alimony ordered by 
the Florida court. He has never denied that Mrs. Carnes is entitled to 
judgment, he has merely quibbled over procedural technicalities. Since 
the district court has now recognized the underlying Florida Decree, 
with its on-going alimony provisions, the present appeal is, in a very 
real sense, moot. !.1r. Carnes is presently earning approximately $2, 700 
per month (R. at 132, 134, and 136); in equity and good conscience he 
should not be permitted to avoid the alimony obligation decreed by the 
Florida court upon the basis of moot technicalities. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE AFFIDAVIT FILED BY MR. CARNES WAS 
UNTIMELY AND DOES NOT RAISE A MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT. 
The Order entered on September 15, 1981, by the late Honorable 
G. Hal Taylor was based upon a motion filed by l\1rs. Carnes on August 26, 
1981. r.1r. Carnes filed no Affidavit, or indeed any other materials, in 
6 
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opposition to that motion until he filed his own Affidavit six months 
later on February 26, 1982. Had he wished to challenge the service of 
process in connection with the Florida arrearage proceedings, his 
Affidavit could just as easily have been filed in August of 1981. The 
Affidavit upon which Mr. Carnes relies was filed six months too late. 
The district court was entirely justified in entering judgment 
irrespective of it. 
In addition to the statement in his Affidavit that he had not 
resided at the address given by Deputy Peterson in his Proof of Service, 
Mr. Carnes offers the conclusion of law that he "was not served at any 
time". (R. at 46.) Even if timely filed, this conclusory generaliza-
tion could not have provided the basis for a "question of fact" upon 
which the motion for summary judgment could have been denied by the 
District Court. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
mandates that any Affidavit submitted in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment state facts on the basis of personal knowledge: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. • • . 
Rule 56(e), U. R. C .P. Whether or not "service" of a legal document has 
occurred is a question of law to be determined on the basis of the 
underlying facts. 
7 
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This Court affirmed a motion for summary judgment granted by 
the trial court notwithstanding the defendant's affidavit containing 
numerous conclusions and opinions without supporting facts in Walker v. 
Rocky Mountain Recreation Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 
(1973). This Court noted and rejected the defendant's contention that 
its conclusory affidavit had created questions of fact precluding 
summary judgment, holding: 
Defendant • • • asserts that there 
were material, disputed issues of fact 
which precluded the trial court from 
granting summary judgment. The opposing 
affidavit submitted by defendant did not 
comport with the requirements of Rule 
56(e), U.R.C.P., i.e. such an affidavit 
must be made on personal knowledge of the 
affiant, and set forth facts which would 
be admissible in evidence and show that 
the affiant is competent to testify to 
the matters stated therein. . . . 
Hearsay and opinion testimony that would 
not be admissible if testified to at 
trial may not properly be set for th in an 
affidavit. 
A review of defendant's opposing 
affidavit reveals no evidentiary facts 
but merely reflects the affiant's 
unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions 
in regard to the transactions. 
508 P. 2d at 542 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). In the present 
action, the Affidavit of Mr. Carnes fails to state a single fact in 
support of his conclusion that he was "never served at any time". 
8 
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Moreover, the only factual allegations of the Affidavit relate 
to the issue of where deputy Grant Peterson actually served ~.1r. Carnes. 
It is not material to valid service where Mr. Carnes was served since 
the service was effected upon him personally. This Court has frequently 
recognized the fundamental principle that only a genuine dispute as to a 
material fact will justify the denial of a motion for summary judgment. 
For example, in Heglar Ranch, Inc., v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 
1980), the district court granted summary judgment notwithstanding that 
a vigorous factual dispute existed as to a r.latter which, even if 
resolved in favor of the persons against whom the summary judgment was 
entered, would not have constituted a valid defense. In affirming the 
summary judgment entered by the trial court, this Court noted: 
Summary judgment is appropriate if 
the pleadings and all other submissions 
show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
The foregoing rule does not preclude 
summary judgment simply whenever soCTe 
fact remains in dispute, but only when a 
material fact is genuinely controverted. 
619 P.2d at 1391 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). In the present 
case, whether Mr. Carnes was served at his home, at his work, or 
anywhere else within the state of Utah, is absolutely irrelevant. If he 
was personally served at all, the Florida judgment is valid and is 
entitled to the full faith and credit of the district court. Therefore, 
9 
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the district court was entirely correct in entering judgment notwith-
standing any dispute which may have existed with respect to where 
~11r. Carnes had been served in connection with the Florida action. 
Similarly, in FMA Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 
17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965), this Court affirmed the granting of 
summary judgment notwithstanding the existence of a vigorous dispute as 
to matters which, even if they had been resolved in favor of the losing 
party, would not have precluded judgment. In that case, as in the 
present action, the defendant attempted to assert in defense of a motion 
for judgment matters not raised in the Answer. The court held that even 
tl the Answer were deemed amended, and even tl the defendant prevailed 
on the factual disputes, the plaintiff would still have been entitled to 
summary judgment, noting: 
[Tl he dispute as to whether the defendant 
did or did not receive statements from 
the Cook Realty is not of critical 
concern. This is the answer to 
defendant's contention that the summary 
judgment should not have been granted 
because of the disagreement about that 
fact. Mere dispute as· to some question 
of fact does not preclude the granting of 
summary judgment. The issue in dispute 
must be one which is material in the 
sense that resolving it is necessary to 
determine the legal rights of the 
parties. 
404 P. 2d at 673 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). In its decision, 
10 
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this Court also noted the fact that, wisely used, summary judgments play 
a vital and important role: 
The trial court concluded that in spite 
of anything contended for by the 
defendant, the plaintiff was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. The 
granting of the summary judgment under 
those circumstances had the salutary 
effect of saving time, effort and expense 
which would have been involved in having 
a trial, which could have served no 
useful purpose. 
Id. at 671 (footnote omitted). This observation is equally applicable 
to the facts of the present case. 
Similarly, in Allen's Products Company v. Glover, 18 Utah 2d 
9, 414 P. 2d 93 ( 1966), this Court held that the district court 
not only can but should grant a motion 
for summary judgment if he feels certain 
that he would rule that way no matter 
what proof a party could produce in 
support of his contentions. 
414 P. 2d at 94. And in Pioneer Savings and Loan Association v. Pioneer 
Finance and Thrift Company, 18 Utah 2d 106, 417 P.2d 121 (1966), this 
Court emphasized that summary judgment 
must be granted and upheld by this court 
if there is no genuine issue as to any 
.material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
• • • • 
417 P.2d at 123. 
11 
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POINT- -Il. ANY DEFECTS IN THE SERVICE UPON 
MR. CARNES, OR IN ITS RETURN, WERE INSUBSTANTIAL AND 
NOT SUFFICIENT TO PRECLUDE THE JUDGMENT GRANTED BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT. 
The only substantial, timely-raised issue relates to the 
difference in the location of the service upon 1\1r. Carnes stated by 
Deputy Peterson in his Proof of Service as opposed to his Affidavit. 
Under the decisions of this Court, that difference is not deemed 
sufficient to constitute a valid ground to refuse entry of judgment. 
In Redwood Land Company v. Kimball, 20 Utah 2d 113, 433 P. 2d 
1010 (1967), the defendant sought to quash service of the summons 
because proof of service was not provided within the prescribed five-day 
period of time. In affirming the trial court's denial of this motion, 
this Supreme Court stated: 
We are in accord with the view adopted by 
the trial court in denying the motion; 
that the defect she complains of is not 
jurisdictional. It is with respect to 
the correctness of the summons itself, 
and the due service thereof, which 
notifies the defendant that he is being 
sued, and by which jurisdiction over him 
is acquired, that there must be strict 
compliance. [Citations omitted.] How-
ever, proof of the fact that such service 
has been made, also ref erred to as the 
return of the summons, is something of a 
different character. Its only purpose is 
to supply the information to the court, 
12 
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the interested parties and their atorneys 
that the defendant has been so served. 
• • • 
When the procedure described for the 
acquisition of jurisdiction of the 
defendant has been properly carried out, 
that is where there has been a correct 
service of a proper summons, a mistake or 
irregularity of the kind here shown in 
the proof of service does not destroy the 
validity of the service itself. 
433 P.2d at 1010-1011. 
The same rule is followed in Florida. For example, in 
Klosenski v. Flaherty, 116 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1959), the court held that 
an officer's return of service is no part of the service but merely 
evidence to enable the trial judge to determine whether jurisdiction 
over the defendant has been acquired. An irregularity in the proof of 
service as demonstrated by the Affidavit filed by Mr. Carnes is not 
jurisdictional. 
This sound rule was also applied in Brand-t v. Daman Trailer 
Sales, Inc., 116 Ariz. 421, 569 P.2d 851 (1977), in which it was held 
, 
that defects in a return of service do not deprive the court of 
jurisdiction, which is acquired by the service itself. 
AdditionB.lly, Section 17-22-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended), provides: 
The return of the sheriff upon process or 
notice is prim a f acie evidence of the 
facts in such return stated. 
§17-22-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended.) In the face of this 
13 
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prima facie evidence of personal service upon him, ~.1r. Carnes only 
demonstrated technical defects in the Proof of Service. He submitted no 
timely Affidavit and even his Affidavit filed six months after the 
motion contained no factual statements to support his conclusion that he 
"was never served". Thus, Mr. Carnes never successfully refuted the 
presumption of service. 
That a defective or inconsistent return of service of process 
is not a jurisdictional defect is further established by Rule 4(h) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: 
At any time in its discretion and upon 
such terms as it deems just, the court 
may allow any process or proof of service 
thereof to be amended, unless it clearly 
appears that material prejudice would 
result to the substantial rights of the 
party against whom the service is issued. 
Rule 4(h), U.R.C.P. Permitting an amendment of the Proof of Service 
supplied by Deputy Peterson did not prejudice ?l1r. Carnes, for the place 
of service does not change the fact of personal service. In Federal 
Land Bank of Berkley v. Brenton, 106 Utah 149, 146 P.2d 200 (1944), the 
Utah Supreme Court held: 
The fact that service has been made, by 
the weight of authority, may be proved or 
a defective proof of service may be 
amended after judgment. It is held that 
it is the fact of service that gives 
jurisdiction, not the proof of it. 
146 P. 2d at 201 (emphasis added). Where process has been properly 
14 
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served, a technical defect in the paperwork that can be readily 
corrected to speak the truth should not be allowed to interfere with 
substantial justice. The District Court's decision to enter judgment 
based upon unpaid alimony that Mr. Carnes never denied should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Carnes complied fully with the Order of the late 
Judge Taylor, providing a certified and exemplified copy of Proof of 
Service in the Florida arrearage proceedings. She also went beyond the 
requirements of Judge Taylor's order and provided an Affidavit of Deputy 
Peterson, again establishing personal service. 
Some six months after the filing of the motion for judgment 
against him, Mr. Carnes filed a conclusory Affidavit, claiming that he 
was "never served" but utterly failing to state any factual allegations 
upon which that conclusion could be based. Moreover, he has never, to 
this day, presented any evidence or argument that the alimony arrearage 
upon which the present judgment is based is not, in fact, due. He now 
earns approximately $2, 700 per month and should not be permitted to 
benefit from procedural technicalities or delay which he has created. 
In view of the fact that the District Court has now recognized 
the on-going alimony provisions of the Florida Decree and r.1r. Carnes has 
15 
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filed no appeal from that Order, his argument that the judgment entered 
against him should be reversed is, in a very real and practical sense. 
absolutely moot. The judgment entered against appellant Cliff Carnes 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /day of July, 1982. 
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